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TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE COMBAT
ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND INTELLIGENCE (CEWI) DOCTRINAL
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
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
TACTICAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE COMBAT ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND
INTELLIGENCE (CEWI) DOCTRINAL CONCEPT

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Covalucci
Military Intelligence

US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
20 May 1983



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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert J. Covalucci, LTC, MI

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The CEWI concept provides traditional counterintelligence support to the tactical commander. However, to execute the Airland Battle concept, expanded responsibilities must be accomplished by CI personnel, to include; tactical "low level" agent operations, OPSEC analysis, and support to deception and counter-deception planning. To meet these requirements the Army should develop an intelligence linguist career management field, an OPSEC analyst program, and develop appropriate concepts for the implementation of a tactical HUMINT collection capability.

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Combat Intelligence is a multifunctional discipline. It has the ultimate goal of providing the unit commander with sufficient information to reduce risk taking to an absolute minimum. Routinely, US Army tactical units employ Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) to achieve this goal. Through the use of these intelligence collection means vast quantities of information on the enemy disposition, composition, capabilities and intentions are collected. This information is then provided to intelligence analysts who consolidate and fuse the pieces into an intelligence estimate. The quality of the estimate is directly related to the degree of risk that must be accepted by the commander.

In support of the above process many thousands of words and pages have been written by individual authors and by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). On an annual basis billions of dollars are budgeted by the US Government to support the SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT collection programs, and sizable analytical resources are maintained to fuse this collected data into intelligence estimates, studies and periodic reports. Collection and analysis of the enemy is designed into our organizational structures from the limited assets at the military battalion level to the computer driven high technology systems at the national command authority level.

The key point thus far is that intelligence, at any level, must focus on reducing the risk that must be accepted by the supported commander. It is recognized that risk taking will never be eliminated. While a force is collecting information on an enemy that enemy is simultaneously attempting to deny the collection of information by the opposition and is involved in

deception operations or the manipulation of information collected by the opposition.

If we must accept that we can not deny an enemy the use of his multi-disciplined intelligence collection systems, then we must develop appropriate doctrine and provide sufficient resources to our programs that are designed to deny information to our enemies. We must develop plans to deceive his intelligence operations. This is a mission that has been tasked to Army counterintelligence (CI). At the tactical level, the execution of this mission has been incorporated into the Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) concept. How well are we prepared to execute this mission, and what changes or modifications are necessary? To answer these questions it is necessary to determine what is expected and required of Army CI.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, dated 1 January 1979 states:

Counterintelligence--The phase of intelligence covering all activities devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, personnel against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

US Army Field Manual 30-17 Counterintelligence Operations, dated January 1972 states:

The mission of counterintelligence elements and units is to support the commander through the detection of treason, espionage, sabotage, sedition, subversive activities, and dissatisfaction, and the prevention and neutralization of espionage and sabotage for the protection of the US Army.

And, finally, let us look at a more timely treatment of tactical counterintelligence. US Army Field Manual 100-5, dated 20 August 1982, acknowledges that tactical CI includes countersabotage, counterespionage, internal security investigations as well as personnel and information security, but, additionally, FM 100-5 states:

Tactical CI supports OPSEC by identifying vulnerabilities and by eliminating or controlling the intelligence indicators susceptible to hostile exploitations. Intelligence support to OPSEC

consists of developing and analyzing data on the enemy's intelligence--collecting capabilities and on friendly profiles. Such an analysis uncovers the sensitive aspects of a planned operation; determines essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) that, if known by the enemy, will compromise the operation; and assesses friendly susceptibilities. The G2 or the S2 assists the G3 or the S3 in making these determinations and risk assessments. Then the G3 or the S3 OPSEC staff officer uses them to propose effective countermeasures to the commander.

All of the definitions of counterintelligence discussed thus far address the counter-HUMINT aspect of counterintelligence. This limiting definition of counterintelligence is unacceptable today. We must recognize that counterintelligence is not only counter-HUMINT, but it is also counter-IMINT and counter-SIGINT. To properly conduct CI activities on today's battlefield requires that the CI operator receive "all-source" information from non-CI operations. CI as a function must therefore combine all the intelligence from battlefield collection disciplines and assets and pass the information to a selected group of individuals who are sufficiently well trained to evaluate the enemy threat and are sufficiently sophisticated to develop countermeasures that can be taken by the supported commander.

In addition to the expanded multidisciplined counterintelligence definition that has been developed above, it is necessary to clearly identify and understand the counterintelligence role with or in tactical deception operations. Since counterintelligence is evaluating "all-source" battlefield information and recognizing that most deception operations will be presented through multiple information sources, does it follow that CI should be responsible for identifying deception operations? Or, is the identification of deception operations a responsibility of the order of battle analyst, or even the G3 who is responsible for friendly deception operations? Most likely counter-deception analysis is an activity that must be directed by the G2 with constant interface between CI and order of

battle personnel. If CI personnel are actively engaged in counter-espionage (CE), penetrations, or double agent operations they may be the conduit of deception information, and conversely, they have the potential to expose an enemy deception plan through a successful CE operation.

An examination of the other side of the coin, the counterintelligence role in the development of friendly deception operations, must be conducted and evaluated. Although CI personnel are not best suited to develop the deception objective that is desired by the command (a role clearly the responsibility of the G3) CI personnel are best suited to identify the enemy collection systems that can be exploited and determine the methods of transmission of the bogus information. The CI section should also be prepared to: advise the command on the mix of data that should be generated, identify collection systems that should be targeted, establish a timetable for the release of the information, and conduct aggressive CI operations to evaluate the successfulness of the operation during its execution. Added to the multidisciplined responsibilities of CI and the CI role in deception operations, we must also establish the CI role in operations security (OPSEC).

The treatment in Field Manual 34-10, Military Intelligence Battalion (Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence) (Division), dated 15 January 1982 of the OPSEC mission performed by counterintelligence personnel assigned to the MI Battalion is compatible with FM 100-5. Additionally, both FM 100-5 and FM 34-10 agree that only through detailed OPSEC planning can effective deception operations be conducted. Thus, it is recognized that deception operations are dependent to a large extent on the counterintelligence personnel who provide OPSEC support to the unit operations officer (G3/S3). As cited above, FM 100-5 recognizes that OPSEC analysis is an essential element of an effective OPSEC program. Yet, to date, the Army has not

changed the basic Counterintelligence Operations manual, FM 30-17, nor developed a comprehensive personnel management or training program to support the counterintelligence responsibilities to OPSEC reflected in FMs 100-5 and 34-10.

Before looking at possible solutions to these problems it is necessary to discuss the types of conflict within which the US Army is most likely to be engaged in the near and mid-range. This is essential since resource constraints will be a driving factor in our doctrinal and force structure development. US national policy clearly states that we, as a nation, have no intention of attacking and occupying territories of any other sovereign nation. Our forward deployed forces in Europe and Korea are deployed in a defensive posture and have the mission of maintaining peace and the current international boundaries. As recently as 26 April 1983, President Reagan stated on national television that the United States has no intention of committing US combat forces into Latin America. The Rapid Deployment Force concept, which has now mutated into Central Command (CENTCOM), has a mission of confronting Soviet or Soviet surrogate aggression outside the borders of the Soviet Union and hopefully at the invitation of the violated nation state. US Army forces are and most probably will continue to execute peace keeping missions at the request of the United Nations or as a result of US initiated diplomatic actions. And finally, US Army forces will be involved in countering terrorist activities both in the United States and overseas.

Although no attempt has been made to rank order the above types of conflict many observers believe that the less violent forms of conflict are the most probable. What is extremely important is recognizing where these military operations will be conducted. Where in this context does not refer to a specific geographical location. It refers to the political and motivational environment of the tactical area. Historically the most successful

tactical counterintelligence operations, which by their nature are HUMINT operations, have been conducted where there was access to partisans or a friendly population in the target area. The conflicts outlined above have in common that they will be fought in tactical areas currently held by a friendly government or held by a government that will request US assistance. In either situation, it appears that the enemy forces as they attack our allied or friendly nation will be surrounded by a civilian population that will support US objectives. This population will be in direct proximity to the tactical area of operation, and they clearly represent a lucrative source for "low level" HUMINT operations.

I submit that there is a pressing need to support tactical commanders with HUMINT coverage of the enemy second and follow-on echelon. But, the Army has no Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units. The target area is behind the deployment area of Special Forces units. The mission is not suitable for Ranger units, and the Long-Range Surveillance Outpost (LRSO) company proposed for the Tactical Exploitation Battalion (TEB) of the Corps MI Group (CEWI) has not been approved. Since we are concerned with tactical "low level" HUMINT operations that are of short duration and must be executed on a time sensitive basis they are an inappropriate mission for Echelon Above Corps (EAC) HUMINT operations. Within tactical units the soldiers who are best equipped to assume this mission are tactical counterintelligence agents. As indicated, CI personnel are trained in handling human sources. CI operations in CE, double agent and penetration operations encompass all the skills required for limited offensive HUMINT operations at the tactical level. Because of the fluidity and size of modern battlefields and the expertise required to execute HUMINT operations it appears that this mission should be assigned to the OPSEC company of the Corps MI Group (CEWI). Although the concept for the execution of this

proposal requires additional study and refinement, the need for this capability is apparent to even the casual observer of the AirLand Battle doctrine. Targeting requirements for second echelon and follow-on forces can not currently be satisfied by existing collection capabilities. This is essential since the targeting of the enemy second echelon is a critical component of the AirLand Battle concept. Without this ability we will be unable to judiciously allocate limited weapon systems, interrupt the flow of enemy forces into the main battle area, or develop the battle lulls required to effectively conduct counterattack operations or to exploit enemy weaknesses.

In the tactical arena "low level" HUMINT operations will use sources that have natural access into target areas. Sources may be refugees, line crossers, defectors or legal business people. Additionally, individuals may be spotted and assessed in peace time without being approached or recruited until time on conflict. Although I will not go into the details of the methods of operation, it should be understood that a source might be used for only one mission, receive very little training prior to employment, and may not be expected to return to his agent handler. This type HUMINT operation should be controlled within the theater. Tactical HUMINT operations must be of limited duration and scope. Strategic and long-range HUMINT operations will continue to be conducted at echelons above Corps (EAC). These operations will be subject to existing administrative and procedural restrictions.

Considering the "low level" HUMINT mission that I am recommending and the expanded OPSEC support role required of the counterintelligence agent, the tactical CI agent has an extremely important role to play in minimizing the risk that the commander must accept. To come to grips with this expanded

HUMINT/OPSEC role for CI, fresh and innovative approaches to personnel management and training must be examined. Changes to our present systems may require modification of Army wide programs while others may be limited to the intelligence system. A critical skill that will be required to execute the type HUMINT operations that is recommended for tactical CI personnel is linguistic proficiency.

This is an area in which a detailed evaluation of current Army programs must be conducted. Consideration must be given to the development of a linguist procurement and retention strategy. This strategy must consider a career management program not only for CI personnel but also for the other army intelligence occupational specialities that require language skills. For many years the Army has decried its ability to attract and retain qualified linguists. Yet, there had been no major change in our procurement or retention strategy. The Army continues to throw money at the problem with dismal results. This problem directly affects CI operations. Although CI personnel should have second and in some cases third language proficiency to conduct low level agent operations, debriefings, liaisons, investigations in a host country, and support to OPSEC only 203, of the currently authorized 921 CI agent spaces, are validated with a language requirement. The Army must take forceful action to solve the overall language problem. An officer linguist program should include; all US Military Academy cadets and ROTC cadets on scholarship must qualify in a foreign language prior to commissioning; personnel in selected advance degree programs must qualify in a foreign language, and intelligence officers in career field 36 must be qualified in a foreign language. Additionally, a Career Management Field (CMF) for intelligence linguists should be established to manage enlisted personnel. These personnel should be recruited, trained, and receive proficiency pay based upon their linguist

skill. Throughout their career they will be assigned against validated linguist positions. If, as an example, a linguist has been trained with a primary skill of voice intercept operator and his subsequent assignment is CI agent then the individual will attend a CI training module between assignments. This program will focus and capitalize on the perishable high cost skill of language proficiency. It will reward the soldier monetarily and professionally. This system of personnel management will provide the Army with a pool of linguists to meet quick reaction contingency requirements as well as MTOE and TDA requirements.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ENLISTED LINGUIST AUTHORIZATIONS AS OF JUNE 1983

SIGINT	HUMINT	TOTAL
2347	1595	
	CI Agent 921*	3942
	Area Operations 136	
	Interrogator 538	

A Considerable problem associated with the retention of linguist personnel has been the Army's inability to provide the soldier linguist with meaningful training, particularly in CONUS assignments. Yet, it is impossible to keep soldiers overseas constantly. Additionally, tactical intelligence units have a mix of both SIGINT and HUMINT linguists. In some areas there is an abundance of operational or training activities for SIGINT soldiers but none for HUMINT soldiers. While in other situations (such as refugee support operations) HUMINT soldiers may have extensive

*Of the 921 enlisted CI agent spaces authorized only 203 have been validated as language required. Therefore 78 percent of the Army enlisted CI agent spaces do not generate language training requirements. Although this may reduce the statistical shortfall in Army linguists, it also reduces the go to war capability of the US Army.

requirements while there are none for the SIGINT operators. This problem can be ameliorated if soldiers are recruited and paid with the understanding that the US Army is hiring linguists. Currently, the Army hires SIGINT or HUMINT operators. Incidental to that recruitment the soldier may or in some cases must be sent to language school. But, based on the Army's contract with the soldier, the intelligence skill is the primary recruitment incentive and special pay and reenlistment bonuses are predicated on the intelligence skill. It is no wonder that a soldier is not anxious to become involved in second skill training, especially if it might mean a loss of pay. To counter this problem the soldier should be recruited and trained as an intelligence linguist. The initial language training should be based on Army language needs. Subsequent language proficiency in additional languages should accrue special monetary bonuses to the soldier. The significant difference in this system is that the soldier recognizes well in advance that his language proficiency is the vehicle for promotion and monetary reward, and that the Army will determine in which intelligence skill or skills he will be trained. The intelligence linguist CMF provides to the Army assignment and operational flexibilities that are impossible to achieve under existing linguist management systems. It also places up front the more difficult and most costly aspect of current SIGINT/HUMINT training programs. Any soldier who fails to qualify at a certain level, at the end of language training, can either be released from duty or be assigned to a non-linguist skill. For the CI agent multi-skill training will be extremely beneficial since any assignment outside of CI will give him detailed knowledge of one of the multidisciplined aspects of intelligence that he will need to know to conduct his CI mission. Creating a force of 3942 dual skilled military intelligence linguists is a

quantum improvement over our present attempt to acquire 2347 SIGINT linguists and 1595 HUMINT soldiers of whom all are not language training required.

Critics of the intelligence linguist CMF will quickly claim that expertise in a specific phase of intelligence operations will be lost. To counter this problem the linguist CMF should have a mechanism to single track personnel at certain career bench marks. This program should also consider the development of a broad warrant officer program to insure upward career mobility for linguist personnel. It must be recognized that the majority of the Army's force structure is concentrated at the tactical level. At this level the type of operations envisioned are less complex but more time sensitive.

The critical assumption in the adoption of an intelligence linguist CMF is that the language skill is more important for entrance qualification and career management than the skill for which soldiers are presently recruited and trained. Secondly, it must be proven that soldiers recruited as linguists are capable of being trained into intelligence specialties and cross trained into a second "utilization" skill. The Army must evaluate the present duty/work utilization of linguists, retention profiles, and job satisfaction of linguists. Then, a study of an intelligence linguist CMF should be compared to our current system. A point that must be made clear is that a linguist CMF should not result in the formation of linguist units. In order to configure in peace for a smooth transition to war requires that whenever possible soldiers must be used in the duty positions in which they will find themselves in war. In addition to the development of unit team work and tactical skills, assignment of linguist personnel to tactical units insures that they do not lose sight of their duties as

soldiers first. When assigned to a tactical MI (CEWI) unit the only distinction that separates a military linguist from an infantryman is his weekly program of linguist training and perhaps one sixty-day peacetime utilization training period as part of the Readiness Training Program (REDTRAIN).¹ If we can fix the language acquisition system and expand CI operations to include offensive "low level" tactical HUMINT operations have we fulfilled the expressed and implied missions that CI must perform? Can the CI agent accomplish his mission without specific help? Help beyond that which is presently available! We recently answered that question with a program that missed the mark.

As a result of severe personnel shortages in the enlisted CI career field a fix, known as the Counterintelligence Assistant Program, was initiated in January 1981. The goal of this program was to recruit 97B10 personnel as assistants to counterintelligence agents (97B20-97B40). The 97B10s that were recruited were sent to a 10 week training course at the Intelligence Center and School. Personnel were then assigned to tactical units. They were intended to provide help to CI agents in investigative and OPSEC support functions, but they were not badge carrying, credentialed, agents.²

Some have claimed that this program was the reincarnation of the 97D, CI Coordinator Program. The 97D was a CI clerk/typist and all around clerical support man to the CI agent work force. This program did produce many CI agents. But, in contrast to the 97B10 program, the 97D MOS was supported by TOE and TDA authorized spaces. The 97B10 program was not properly documented with appropriate doctrine and force structure support mechanisms. In the 97B10 program the soldier must serve only a one year minimum in a tactical CI/OPSEC assignment before he might be eligible for

follow-on training as a 97B20, CI agent. Inadequate and incomplete planning and staffing forced the suspension of the program in August 1981. What is noteworthy is the phenomenal appeal of the program in the recruitment phase. The data provided below indicates that work in the CI/OPSEC field is attractive to young Americans. A similar program with equally, if not greater career potential, should result in similar success.³

97B10 PERSONNEL TRAINED BY USAICS

CLASS	WHEN GRADUATED	NUMBER GRADUATED	TOTAL GRADUATED
81-97B10-1	MAR 81	8	8
81-97B10-2	MAY 81	43	51
81-97B10-3	JUN 81	21	72
81-97B10-4	JUL 81	22	94
81-97B10-5	JUL 81	41	135
81-97B10-6	SEP 81	42	177
81-97B10-7	SEP 81	30	207
81-97B10-8	OCT 81	46	253
82-97B10-501	DEC 81	24	277
82-97B10-1	MAR 82	32	309
82-97B10-2	MAY 82	32	341
82-97B10-3	MAY 82	19	360
82-97B10-6	SEP 82	38	398
82-97B10-9	(DEC 82)	(15?)	(413?)

NOTE: Class 82-97B10-9 is currently in session with 15 students.

It is often observed that US government intelligence services collect more information than can be processed by our analysts. To compound this problem, Army intelligence has not developed an analyst to execute the OPSEC support mission assigned to tactical MI units. To effectively perform OPSEC analysis an individual must have knowledge of both friendly and enemy forces; must understand cause and effect relationships of information transfer on the battlefield; must be trained to develop options to counter known friendly weaknesses; and must earn credibility in the eyes of the commander and the unit staff. This is where we should place our money. The Army should develop, within the CI career field, positions and a training program

specifically for OPSEC analysts. This training program must include: the analytical techniques taught in current order of battle analyst programs; operating procedures and technical signatures of US forces; deception and counter-deception techniques; and methods and procedures to reduce or selectively alter US force signatures. The mission of the OPSEC analyst must include these areas:


- Understand the enemy's intelligence collection systems and develop methods and sources to evaluate the success of his efforts.
- Learn the technical capabilities of the enemy's collection equipment and develop methods to reduce its collection potential or deceive/alter the information that is acquired about the friendly force.
- Understand the doctrinal employment of the enemy's intelligence collection efforts.
- Maintain files on the enemy's collection activities to include collection profiles of each collection means and pattern analysis, where appropriate.
- Know the method of operations, signature profile, operational tactics, and employment doctrine of friendly forces, to include allied forces that may be deployed on a flank of the US force.
- Be fully knowledgeable on the area of operations.
- Conduct continual assessment and reassessment of friendly force OPSEC weaknesses and strengths.
- Provide insight to and an evaluation of deception operations.
- Function as the pseudo collection manager of the countersurveillance assets or programs of the command
- Prepare Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR) for the unit Collection Plan that supports the development of the OPSEC data base.

- Recommend countermeasures to reduce or capitalize on friendly force OPSEC vulnerabilities.

The OPSEC analyst should be an entrance level recruitment skill. Upon completion to their initial tour of duty OPSEC analysts should be viewed as a source for CI agent recruitment. These personnel will be extremely valuable to the Army since they will have the analytical skill to complement their agent activities and to make them more effective in directing OPSEC analytical efforts and providing credible advice to the commander.

The importance of the upgrading of the tactical CI/OPSEC capabilities of our forces is necessary to successfully execute the AirLand Battle Concept against a technically sophisticated and numerically superior enemy. These improvements are also necessary to enhance the security of US forces in major contingency or low level conflicts.

However, the OPSEC analyst skill must not be limited to tactical units. This expertise is as essential to echelons above corps as it is at the tactical level. Positions in TOE and TDA documents must be established prior to the implementation of this program. If force structure increases are not available to support this mission enhancement of intelligence units, then functional trade-offs must be made and spaces identified. A career progression profile of the OPSEC analyst might look like this:



The basic strength of the OPSEC analysts program is that it puts teeth into an Army doctrine that is essential to force security. We must recognize that any doctrine requires the appropriate support if it is to be

effectively implemented. We have correctly identified the dangers of poor OPSEC. We are learning from historical facts the value of deception and counter-deception operations. Additionally, we are recognizing the changing complexity of OPSEC in our technological environment. With this work accomplished we are negligent if we do not develop and resource the Army to counter the threat and to execute the OPSEC mission. The OPSEC analyst is not the total solution, but it is a major step in the right direction. With properly trained OPSEC analysts assigned to tactical MI units, required focus and expertise will be developed to enhance and better execute this mission.

There are many challenges in today's Army for all who are willing to work innovately. As military professionals we appear to have directed our energies to solve problems with things that can be seen, weighted, quantified, and give us a hard copy product. These bright and shiny gadgets are expensive, require constant upgrading to meet countermeasures technology, are bought in limited quantities (to the exclusion of war reserve stocks or reserve component units), and present maintenance nightmares on an extremely lethal battlefield. It is time we shift our focus to the human side of the equation. True, humans have watts and blemishes and often the product gained by human intelligence is not as easy to quantify, but its tactical impact can be spectacular. Counterintelligence in the CEWI concept must not only achieve a multidisciplined defensive posture for the command, but it must also project an offensive HUMINT collection capabilities that is presently absent in Army doctrine. We can no longer hide our heads in the sand and accept that only 22 percent of the US Army's enlisted counter-intelligence spaces are foreign language required. We must establish an intelligence linguist career management field that will provide the Army with a more flexible, more economic, and more mission capable linguist

force. This will require a revolutionary change in our current personnel management system. It will only be accomplished by men of vision who are convinced that correcting this current weakness in our Army is every bit as important as fielding the M-1 tank. In a time of massive modernization additional changes to Army organizations or personnel systems is extremely unpopular, and rightfully so. But our linguist recruitment and retention problems have gone on too long; the lack of an up-dated counterintelligence doctrine for the field is necessary; appropriate concepts and resources to achieve our OPSEC goals are waiting to be fielded; and a tactical HUMINT collection effort is necessary to enhance our ability to execute the AirLand Battle doctrine. Properly addressed, these challenges will assist in the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of intelligence, the reduction of the risk that must be accepted by the unit commander.

ENDNOTES

1. Don E. Gordon, Lieutenant Colonel, "Soldier or Linguist?", Military Intelligence, Vol 5, No. 2, April-June 1979, p. 44.
2. "The 97B Dilemma," Military Intelligence, Vol 8, No. 4, October-December 1982, p. 50.
3. Ibid.

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